What Works? A Systematic Review of Corporate Crime Deterrence Rorie
| Corporate Crime Deterrence: A Systematic ReviewSally S. Simpson, Melissa Rorie, Mariel Alper, Natalie Schell‐Busey, William Southward. Laufer and N. Craig Smith Campbell Systematic Reviews, 2014, vol. 10, issue 1, i-105 Abstract: This Campbell systematic review examines the effects of interventions to deter corporate criminal offense. The review examines the effectiveness of formal legal and authoritative strategies to lower the hazard of non‐compliance. The authors summarized 106 studies, and the interventions are grouped into six intervention categories, each with sub‐categories. The intervention groups are: (ane) laws, (2) punitive sanctions (e.g. arrest, fines, or a likelihood of prosecution), (3) non‐castigating actions by regulatory agencies (e.chiliad. cease and desist orders) (4) regulatory policies (east.g. company inspections), (5) other sanctions, and (6) multiple treatments. Legal interventions have a pocket-size deterrent result on visitor non‐compliance and at the geographical level. There is not enough data to make up one's mind the furnishings of legal interventions on deterring individual offending. Regulatory interventions have a modest but consistent deterrent effect on private offending. Their effects on deterrence at the company level were mixed. The apply of more than one intervention at the same time was establish to have a pocket-size but consistent result on deterring non‐compliance among individuals and amid corporations. Evidence on the effects of the other interventions on non‐compliance was mixed. Conclusions almost their furnishings therefore cannot be fatigued. Overall, the quality of testify was low, with several contradictory findings. Older studies were more probable to observe significant effects, simply this may reflect weaker study designs. Executive summary/Abstract Groundwork Corporate crime is a poorly understood problem with piffling known about constructive strategies to prevent and control information technology. Competing definitions of corporate crime affect how the phenomenon is studied and implications for reducing it. Therefore, in this review, we use John Braithwaite's definition (1984: 6) which specifies that corporate crime is "the behave of a corporation, or of employees interim on behalf of a corporation, which is proscribed and punishable past police." Consistent with this approach, this review focuses on various legal strategies aimed at companies and their officials/managers to curtail corporate crime. Interventions may be punitive or cooperative, simply the goal is to prevent offending and increase levels of corporate compliance. OBJECTIVES Our overall objective is to place and synthesize published and unpublished studies on formal legal and administrative prevention and control strategies—i.e., the deportment and programs of authorities law enforcement agencies, legislative bodies, and regulatory agencies on corporate offense. Nosotros so assess the impact of these strategies on private and company offending. Included are legal and authoritative interventions such equally new laws or changes in laws, inspections by regulatory agencies, punitive sanctions and non‐punitive interventions aimed at deterring or controlling illegal behaviors. CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION OF STUDIES We were highly inclusive in our selection criteria, including studies that encompass a wide variety of methodologies: experimental (east.g., lab studies or vignette surveys), quasi‐experimental (eastward.1000., pre/post‐tests), and non‐experimental (e.g., correlational statistics using secondary information). The studies included also contained a wide diversity of data (e.g., data from official agencies, corporate reports, individuals' survey responses, etc.). Our search included published and unpublished articles, reports, documents, and other readily available sources. The outcome of involvement, corporate offending, could reflect bodily behavior or behavioral intentions equally reported by respondents. SEARCH STRATEGY Our search strategy included numerous online databases and other sources (41 in total) to place published and unpublished studies consistent with our definition of corporate crime. Sixty‐nine search terms were generated to conduct the search, including specific terms associated with corporate offending (misconduct, corruption, unethical conduct, and organizational crime), offense type, and legal/regulatory strategies. For each database and search term, we tracked the number of "hits" gleaned from the search and determined whether the article related to corporate crime deterrence (broadly defined) and if there was quantitative bear witness that might be coded for a systematic review. Studies meeting both criteria were considered "potentially eligible" and went through the adjacent phase of eligibility coding. Information COLLECT ION AND ANALYSIS This research proceeded in two phases—the first phase (through 2003) collected studies of any intervention blazon (legal and otherwise) that focused on corporate crime prevention and command. The 2nd stage of the project focused exclusively on prevention and control strategies solely in the legal surface area. Reflecting the broader focus of the first stage, we created a coding protocol that included the unabridged domain of corporate criminal offense prevention/deterrence enquiry which included the specific treatment variables we are interested in here—legal restraints. 2 hundred and sixty 5 studies were eligible for inclusion. From each included study, we coded diverse forms of information classified into and calculated multiple types of effect sizes. These included 1) the "standardized mean‐departure effect size" for analyses comparing ii groups' performance on a continuous issue, two) the "production‐moment correlation issue size" for relationships in which both the independent variable and dependent variable are continuous (or causeless to represent a continuous construct), and iii) the "Odds‐Ratio Event Size" when both the contained and dependent variables involved are dichotomous. Interventions were classified into six treatments and broken down by subgroups (unit of measurement of analysis and whether the design was cross‐exclusive or longitudinal). We also conducted moderator analyses. MAIN RESULTS Out of the 40 possible treatment categories, we were able to summate a mean result size for 19. Although nearly showed a positive albeit non‐significant treatment effect, some (including a significant effect) were iatrogenic. Looking at the specific mechanisms, the touch on of law on corporate crime showed a modest deterrent effect at the firm and geographical level of analysis (there was non plenty data to calculate effect sizes for individuals). However, this finding is limited to cross‐sectional studies. For punitive sanctions, where there was substantially more information from which to calculate effect sizes, nosotros observe a like blueprint: A tendency toward deterrence beyond units of analysis, with relatively few significant effects regardless of whether information are cross‐sectional or longitudinal. The one area where there appears to exist a consequent treatment effect is in the area of regulatory policy, simply only at the individual level. Furnishings for other levels are contradictory (with some positive and others iatrogenic) and none are statistically significant. Regarding moderator effects, the least methodologically rigorous designs— those that were not experimental versus experimental designs and those without statistical control variables versus controls were associated with a treatment effect. Nosotros also plant that older studies were associated with stronger deterrent furnishings—peradventure because the older studies are less methodologically rigorous that those that are newer. Other moderator results were less articulate (publication bias, country bias, disciplinary bias; criminal offense type), just given how few of the analyses revealed strong treatment effects overall nosotros retrieve it is premature to depict any conclusions from these findings and call instead for more methodologically rigorous and focused studies specially in the punitive sanction and regulatory policy areas. Date: 2014 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:camsys:five:10:y:2014:i:1:p:one-105 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Campbell Systematic Reviews from John Wiley & Sons |
Source: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:camsys:v:10:y:2014:i:1:p:1-105
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